Structures to Bridge the Engagement Gap: Abolishing Police and Crime Commissioners Deepens the Democratic Deficit

Scrapping Police and Crime Commissioners (PCCs) may look like an efficiency gain – but it risks widening the gap between police and the public. The government’s own figures note turnout and awareness have been “incredibly low” for PCCs, with around 2-in-5 people not even knowing who their PCC is. These challenges, however, don’t stem from engagement failures but from the fundamental difficulty of competing with other democratic institutions that are all vying for the same space within the public narrative. PCCs must fight for attention alongside MPs, councillors, mayors, and a crowded landscape of elected officials – each demanding public awareness and participation. In this context, low turnout and recognition reflect a saturated democratic marketplace rather than a failed concept.

Those structural challenges are real, but they point to the need for clearer democratic architecture – not a reason to junk the only direct democratic link in policing. Removing PCCs would eliminate the one elected official holding forces to account, replacing them with more distant oversight. As one PCC put it, this change is “swapping an elected PCC for an appointed one…removing democracy.”

The risk is that closing PCCs simply amplifies the democratic deficit. For over a decade PCCs gave a single, visible local leader answerable to the public on crime issues. Losing that figure means no clear contact point for citizens.

PCCs were introduced when Theresa May was home secretary, influenced by America’s model of electing key local officials and part of an idea of running services via localism. In policing, this meant central government would not tinker in local forces. This principle of local democratic accountability remains vital. As Gavin Stephens, chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council, emphasizes: “Democratic accountability of operationally independent policing is essential. Bringing strong, integrated local leadership and the voice of communities into our service is a vitally important part of policing by consent.”

Shifting policing policy to mayors or back-room boards threatens to mute that community voice. As Cleveland’s PCC notes, handing police governance to councillors with wide-ranging duties “does not increase accountability… it dilutes it”. In short, abolition replaces a visible champion for local priorities with hand-picked officials or generalist politicians who may barely notice policing.

Concrete Risks of Scrapping PCCs

Removing PCCs will cut the public out of policing decisions in several ways:

• Lost public voice: Communities would have no direct elected figure to turn to on policing. PCCs have “transformed policing accountability” by giving citizens one known person to praise or blame. Without them, public influence on crime plans and budgets vanishes.
• Trust and consent eroded: Policing by consent relies on local oversight. As Gavin Stephens warns, democratic accountability and bringing the voice of communities into policing keeps the peace. Abolition hands authority to distant bodies, risking cynicism or disconnection.
• Diluted scrutiny: Mayors or councils juggling many issues will give policing only a cursory glance. This centralises control but fragments focus – the dedicated scrutiny PCCs provide will disappear, so mistakes may go unchecked.

Structural Solutions to Reduce the Democratic Deficit

If the decision to abolish PCCs stands, several structural options could help preserve meaningful democratic accountability, whether within Combined Authorities or Non-Mayoral Areas:

• Strengthen Police and Crime Panels Reform existing scrutiny panels rather than disbanding them. Give them real power: budget veto authority, mandatory public hearings on force performance, and resources for independent research. Crucially, include directly elected community representatives alongside councillor members to retain some citizen voice.
• Mandatory Community Assemblies Require regular citizens’ assemblies on policing priorities in each force area. These randomly selected panels (like jury duty) would review budgets, set local priorities, and scrutinise chief constables. This approach has worked in Belgium and Ireland for contentious policy issues—bringing genuine public input without relying on elections with poor turnout.
• Transparent Performance Frameworks Publish real-time, accessible data dashboards on crime, budgets, and force responses. Pair this with statutory duties for whoever takes over PCC functions (mayors, council leaders) to hold quarterly public Q&A sessions specifically on policing. The key is visibility and obligation—making it impossible to bury policing among dozens of other responsibilities.

International Models Worth Examining

New Zealand’s Independent Police Conduct Authority New Zealand separates operational oversight (by an appointed board) from complaint investigations (an independent statutory body). This dual structure ensures professional governance while maintaining public trust through arms-length accountability. For England and Wales, this could mean retaining police boards but creating stronger, more independent inspection regimes with citizen representation.

Scandinavian Consultation Councils Norway and Denmark use local police consultation councils—statutory bodies made up of residents, business groups, and community organisations. They don’t run the police but have formal powers to shape priorities and demand responses. These councils meet publicly and report to parliament, providing structured community voice without relying on elections.

Canadian Civilian Review Boards Many Canadian cities use civilian review boards with powers to investigate complaints, recommend policy changes, and publicly report on force conduct. Board members are appointed through competitive processes emphasising community representation. This model balances expertise with accessibility—crucially, boards have real teeth and public visibility.

The Core Trade-off

The honest answer is that no appointed system fully replaces democratic legitimacy. International evidence shows professional oversight can work efficiently—but it requires:

• Genuine community representation built into structures
• Strong transparency and reporting obligations
• Independent inspection with real consequences
• Cultural change so forces see engagement as core business, not box-ticking

Without such structures, abolishing PCCs simply trades a weak form of democratic accountability for no democratic accountability at all. The engagement problems that plagued PCCs – low turnout, poor awareness, and the challenge of competing for attention in an overcrowded democratic landscape – will only worsen when the public has no direct say whatsoever. If the government is serious about reducing the democratic deficit rather than deepening it, these structural safeguards aren’t optional extras. They are key to maintaining policing by consent.

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