Court of Appeal Rules Councils Cannot Reverse Statutory Schemes Without Proper Process: Implications for Consultation Practice

On 22 January 2026, the Court of Appeal handed down a unanimous judgment in R (Hawes) v London Borough of Tower Hamlets [2026], ruling that a London borough cannot remove a transport scheme included in its Local Implementation Plan (LIP) without first completing a formal revision process. The decision has direct consequences for how public bodies across the United Kingdom manage statutory plans and the consultations that surround them.

Background

The case arose from Tower Hamlets Council’s decision in September 2023 to remove the Bethnal Green “Liveable Streets” Low Traffic Neighbourhood (LTN), a scheme installed between 2020 and 2022 that was explicitly listed in the Council’s approved LIP. When a new Mayor, Lutfur Rahman, took office in 2022, the Council held two rounds of public consultation on removal options before its Cabinet voted to dismantle most of the scheme.

A local residents’ group, Save Our Safer Streets (led by Oliver Hawes), challenged the decision by judicial review. In December 2024, the High Court dismissed all grounds of challenge. The Court of Appeal reached a different conclusion.

The Legal Question

The central issue was the interpretation of section 151(1)(a) of the Greater London Authority Act 1999, which requires London boroughs to “implement the proposals” in their approved LIP. Tower Hamlets argued that this obligation required only that proposals be put into effect at the relevant time; once installed, a scheme could thereafter be removed without reference to the LIP process.

Singh LJ, giving the lead judgment, rejected this reading. The duty to implement carries with it a continuing obligation to retain a scheme once it has been installed. Removing the Bethnal Green LTN, without first revising the LIP and obtaining the Mayor of London’s approval, was therefore unlawful. The removal decision was quashed.

The Court’s reasoning was purposive. If “implement” extended only to initial installation, a council could routinely install LIP measures and then dismantle them for political or financial reasons, leaving the Mayor’s Transport Strategy without practical effect. The statutory framework, which includes mechanisms for LIP revision subject to public consultation and Mayoral approval, would be rendered hollow.

The Consultation Dimension

The appeal succeeded on the statutory duty point rather than on consultation law, but the Court also addressed the adequacy of the two consultation rounds. Applying the well-established Gunning criteria, as affirmed by the Supreme Court in R (Moseley) v London Borough of Haringey [2014], Singh LJ found that the consultations had been conducted fairly. Consultees had been given genuine opportunity to express views on the main options at a stage when the decision remained genuinely open. No procedural unfairness was made out.

The Court also considered whether a third option that emerged during the process, involving partial retention of the scheme with added enforcement measures, required a separate consultation exercise. Singh LJ concluded it did not, treating it as a minor variation rather than a materially different proposal.

These findings are consistent with the existing body of consultation case law. What Hawes adds is a separate kind of constraint: even a perfectly fair consultation on removing a statutory scheme cannot rescue a decision that bypasses the formal plan-revision process. Consulting well is necessary, therefore, but no longer sufficient when the statutory route has been ignored.

Implications Beyond London Transport

The immediate context is London transport planning, but the judgment raises questions that reach considerably further. Practitioners working across a wide range of statutory planning and policy functions should take note.

The principle of statutory lock-in is not new, but its reach is now clearer. Courts have long recognised that where Parliament has established a formal approval process for a plan or policy, that process cannot be circumvented by a subsequent local decision, however well-intentioned or well-consulted. What Hawes clarifies is that the lock-in operates not merely against failing to implement a plan, but equally against dismantling what has already been implemented. This matters wherever a statutory duty is expressed in terms of “implementing” an approved document, because the same reasoning could be applied.

Development plans and local planning authorities. Outside London, local planning authorities in England operate under the Planning and Compulsory Purchase Act 2004 and its successors. Adopted local plans and neighbourhood plans carry statutory weight, and the Secretary of State has oversight powers where authorities fail to comply. Although the planning regime differs from the LIP framework, the logic of Hawes is relevant wherever a plan has been formally adopted and a body then seeks to act inconsistently with its provisions. Authorities proposing to depart from adopted policies, or to abandon committed infrastructure schemes before they are properly superseded, should consider carefully whether they are engaging the right procedure before consulting the public on the proposed change.

National parks and protected area management plans. National park authorities, and other bodies responsible for statutory management plans under environmental legislation, face a comparable structural position. Once a management plan has been approved, actions that run contrary to its provisions cannot straightforwardly be legitimised by a separate internal decision, even if accompanied by public engagement. The Hawes reasoning would support the view that any material departure from an approved management plan requires a formal revision exercise, with the consultation that entails.

Health and social care. Integrated care boards and NHS trusts operate within statutory frameworks that include approved five-year plans and service specifications. Where a service has been commissioned in accordance with an approved plan, decisions to reduce or withdraw that service may be constrained in ways analogous to the LIP duty. The Hawes principle does not automatically transpose to health law, but decision-makers in this field should be alert to the possibility that “implement” language in their governing legislation could be interpreted to impose a similar retention obligation.

Education and schools reorganisation. Local authorities carrying out schools reorganisation under the School Standards and Framework Act 1998 are subject to statutory proposals procedures that include prescribed consultation requirements and, in some cases, approval by a schools adjudicator or the Secretary of State. Decisions to close, amalgamate, or significantly alter a school that has been the subject of an approved statutory proposal cannot be taken by way of a standalone resolution. The parallels with Hawes are direct: the approval process exists to give formal force to a commitment, and that force endures until the statutory process is run again.

Infrastructure and utilities. Major infrastructure projects consented under the Planning Act 2008 or through development consent orders carry obligations that bind the developer throughout the life of the project. Whilst the enforcement mechanisms differ, the underlying logic is similar: consent creates a legal framework that cannot simply be set aside by a subsequent management decision. For public bodies with oversight responsibilities in this area, Hawes reinforces the principle that statutory approval is not merely a gateway but a continuing commitment.

Devolved administrations. In Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, equivalent statutory planning frameworks exist, each with their own approval hierarchies. The specific legislation differs, but the purposive approach to statutory interpretation adopted by Singh LJ is one that courts in all three jurisdictions apply. Practitioners advising public bodies under devolved frameworks should not assume that Hawes is irrelevant simply because the enabling statute differs.

The Wider Lesson for Consultation Practice

Across all of these contexts, Hawes points to a discipline that consultation practitioners will recognise as important but that is not always observed in practice: the need to identify, at the outset, which statutory framework governs a proposed decision and what that framework requires before consultation is designed and launched.

Too often, consultation is treated as an essentially standalone activity. A body identifies a proposed change, designs a consultation exercise, collects responses, and proceeds to a decision. Hawes is a reminder that this sequence can be fatally flawed if the governing statute requires a different process entirely. In that situation, the quality of the consultation becomes legally irrelevant. The public may have been well-informed and genuinely heard, yet the decision can still be quashed because the wrong process was followed.

This has practical consequences for how consultation functions are organised within public bodies. Consultation teams need access to legal advice at the point of project scoping, not only when a challenge has been threatened. The question “are we consulting on the right thing in the right way under the right statutory procedure?” should be asked before the first line of a consultation document is drafted.

There is also a question of public trust. Communities that engage in good faith with a consultation process, and who understand that they are participating in a decision about an existing statutory commitment, are entitled to expect that the formal requirements will be respected. Where a public body conducts a consultation that turns out to have been conducted under the wrong procedure, the resulting decision creates grievance on two levels: the substantive outcome and the process that led to it. Courts can quash the decision; rebuilding public confidence is harder.

What Comes Next

Tower Hamlets has announced its intention in February 2026 to seek permission to appeal to the UK Supreme Court, and a permission application is understood to be pending (case UKSC/2026/0022). The core principle established by the Court of Appeal, that “implement” includes a continuing duty of retention, appears firmly rooted in the statutory context. Should permission be granted, the outcome will be worth watching closely, not only for London transport practitioners but for all those advising public bodies that operate under approved statutory plans.

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